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Stephen J. Redding, London School of Economics and CEPR
I very much enjoyed reading this paper, which addresses an important
policy‐relevant issue. The paper begins by presenting empirical evi-
dence on the impact of currency unions and exchange rate pegs on
the intensive and extensive margins of trade. The paper then moves on
todevelopastochasticgeneralequilibriummodelthatprovidesanatural
explanationfortheempiricalresults.Themainfindingofthepaperisthat
currency unions raise aggregate bilateral trade flows through the exten-
sive margin whereas direct exchange rate pegs raise bilateral trade
through the intensive margin.
Theempiricalanalysisbeginswitha decompositionofaggregatebilat-
eral trade into an extensive and intensive margin following Hummels
and Klenow (2005). In this decomposition, the extensive margin is defined
as the count of goods i exported by source j to destination m weighted by
their importance for world exports:
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In contrast, the intensive margin is defined as country j’se x p o r t st o
destination m relative to world exports to destination m for the same
set of goods:
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Based on this decomposition, the paper estimates a gravity equation
specification for the impact of exchange rate regimes on aggregate bi-
lateral trade and the extensive and intensive margins separately. One
key feature of the gravity equation for aggregate bilateral trade is that
it can be derived from explicit microeconomic foundations, as, for
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978‐0‐226‐10732‐5/2009/2008‐0052$10.00example, in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). While the authors es-
timate several gravity specifications for aggregate bilateral trade, the
gravity equation’s microeconomic foundations suggest that exporter‐
year and importer‐year fixed effects should be included. Their inclusion
allows for changes over time in exporter and importer price indices
(“multilateral resistance”). Therefore, of the specifications considered
by the authors, those with exporter‐year and importer‐year fixed effects
are the more compelling. Additionally, although there are explicit micro-
economic foundations for the gravity equation for aggregate bilateral
trade, the gravity equations for the extensive and intensive margins are
not explicitly derived from such microeconomic foundations. Although
the model developed later in the paper yields theoretical measures of the
intensive and extensive margins, these do not directly correspond to the
empirical measures used in the authors’ econometric specifications.
Therefore, while the model is necessarily an abstraction, there is some
scope for taking the theoretical measures of the extensive and intensive
margins to the data in a more structured way.
Using a gravity equation specification to identify the impact of cur-
rency unions or exchange rate pegs on international trade raises a num-
ber of empirical issues. At the heart of these issues is the program
evaluation problem: we do not observe the counterfactual of what inter-
national trade would have been without the currency union or exchange
rate peg. A particular concern is that the formation of currency unions
and exchange rate pegs is endogenous and there is likely to be selection
on observables and/or unobservables into such exchange rate regimes.
T h el i m i t e dn u m b e ro ft i m es e r i e sc h a n g e si ne x c h a n g er a t er e g i m ei n
the authors’ data precludes the inclusion of bilateral exporter‐importer
pair fixed effects as considered by Glick and Rose (2002), which control
for time‐invariant differences between bilateral trade pairs with a cur-
rency union or bilateral peg and those without. Nonetheless, matching
estimators could be used to examine the robustness of the empirical re-
sults to controlling for selection on observables. Indeed, Persson (2001)
finds that the use of such matching estimators yields quite different
estimates of the impact of currency unions on bilateral trade from ordi-
nary least squares specifications. In terms of the authors’ findings, one
specific concern is that bilateral trade pairs with currency unions are
systematically different from bilateral trade pairs with exchange rate
p e g sa n dt h a ts u c hn o n r a n d o ms e l e c t i o ni sr e s p o n s i b l ef o rt h ed i f f e r e n t
roles of the extensive and intensive margins for these two types of ex-
change rate regime.
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gin for currency unions than for exchange rate pegs, the paper develops
an elegant three‐period stochastic general equilibrium model. In period
t0 firms decide whether to enter the domestic and foreign markets,
while in period t1 firms choose their prices for domestic and foreign
sales and in period t2 production and sales take place. The key assump-
tion of the model is that currency unions adopted in t0 last through t1
and t2 but exchange rate pegs last for only one period. Therefore cur-
rency unions and exchange rate pegs have different effects because only
currency unions affect firms’ entry decisions.
While the idea that only long‐lasting policies affect the entry deci-
sions of firms is clearly important, the differential effects of currency
unions and pegs do follow somewhat mechanically from the assump-
tions about timing made in the model. Natural questions are, why do
currency unions last longer than exchange rate pegs and what happens
when the decision to join a currency union/peg is made endogenous?
Another dimension of the model that would be interesting to explore is
country asymmetries. While solving the model under symmetry is ana-
lytically convenient, many currency unions involve small and poor
countries, which are likely to differ on a number of dimensions from
their larger and richer counterparts.
Nonetheless a key contribution of the paper is to provide microeconomic
foundations for the effects of currency unions and exchange rate pegs on
international trade and its constituent margins through the impact of ex-
change rate uncertainty on firms’ entry and pricing decisions. Further-
more, these effects are derived without assuming a direct impact of
currency unions or exchange rate pegs on the fixed and variable costs
of trade.Suchresearch onmicroeconomicfoundationsiscrucialformak-
ing further progress in understanding the impact of exchange rate re-
gimes on the extent and pattern of international trade.
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